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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UT'AH 
ALMA J. JANKE et ux, 
-vs.-
Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
GEORGE L. BECKSTEAD, JR. et ux, 
Defendants 
and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8866 
In January, 1951, the Plaintiffs agreed to purchase 
a tract of improved real estate from the Defendants. The 
sale was negotiated by an uncle of one of the Defendants. 
Both the Earnest Money Agreement and the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract were executed in January, 1951. 
The Plaintiffs and their family commenced occupying the 
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home shortly thereafter. On several occasions during the 
ensuing months the parties discussed a sale to-· the plain-
tiffs of property adjoining plaintiffs on the east and south 
and owned by the defendants. In December, 1951, the 
final Warranty Deed was executed. On several occasions 
the plaintiffs complained to the Defendants of the flood-
ing of their basement through their septic tank, laterals 
of which extended under the property to the south on 
which Mrs. Beckstead's father was growing corn. 
In the fall of 1952, the plaintiffs received their first 
real property tax notice. Both were disturbed by the 
description in the notice and discussed the matter on two 
occasions with the defendants. The Defendants reassured 
them. In the Summer of 1953, Mr. Dunster, father of 
Mrs. Beckstead, had had called to his attention that the 
point of commencement in the description of his nearby 
property was the center of 9th East Street, a highway run-
ning north and south along the west boundary of the 
Plaintiffs' property. The Defendants thereupon conducted 
an on-the-ground survey and drove stakes on each comer. 
Some months later, the Defendants notified the Plaintiffs 
of a claimed error in the transaction. 
In August, 1956, the Defendants attempted to fence 
off a strip along the east edge of the Plaintiffs property 
and this law suit was commenced. 
The Plaintiffs prayed for a reformation of the deed 
to show the proper description, especially, the point of 
commencement, damages for interference with Plaintiffs' 
septic tank, and for an easement for the laterals. At Pre-
trial the Defendants agreed to an easement for the said 
laterals. 
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The Trial Court found against the Plaintiffs on their 
claim for damages and for an injunction, but found that 
the intention of the parties was to convey a tract of land 
200 feet by 140 feet commencing at a certain fence post 
located on the northwest corner of the plaintiffs' property, 
and along the east edge of Ninth East Street. 
The Defendants have appealed from the findings of 
the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE 
FINDINGS OF A LOWER COURT UNLESS THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
Point II. THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT INASMUCH AS THE WRIT-
TEN INSTRUMENTS OF CONVEYANCE TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT CONFORM TO THE IN-
TENTION OF THE PARTIES. 
Point III. REFORMATION OF A DEED TO CON-
FORM TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE 
FINDINGS OF A LOWER COURT UNLESS THE 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The foregoing statement of Utah law is so well es-
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tablished as to be almost axiomatic. The Utah court has 
spoken clearly on this point. 
In the 1954 case of Clyde v. Clotworthy, 1 Utah 
2d 251, 265 P. 2d 420 cited at 4 Utah L. R. 325, Justice 
Crockett laid down the rules succinctly and clearly. Cit-
ing 16 Am. J ur. 531, Deeds, Sec. 168, he wrote: 
"Where an instrument or instruments of title leave 
ambiguity or uncertainty as to intent, the Court 
may look to surrounding circumstances to deter-
mine it. 
"After the trial court has done so, we will not dis-
turb his findings nor the judgment based thereon 
unless the weight of the evidence is clearly against 
them or he has misapplied principles of law or 
equity." 
In the more recent case of Randall v. Tracy Collins 
Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P. 2d 480, ( 1956) this Court 
said (at page 483) : 
"In an equity review of facts if the record shows 
a fair preponderance or even if the evidence is 
balanced evenly, the trial court findings should be 
sustained." 
See also, Morley v. Willden, 120 Utah 423, 234 P. 2d 
500 ( 1951) ;Pantages v. Arge, 1 Utah 2d 105, 262 P. 2d 
745, ( 1953); Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 
465 (1939). 
Point II. THE RECORD IS CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING IN SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT INASMUCH AS THE WRIT-
TEN INSTRUMENTS OF CONVEYANCE DID 
NOT CONFORM TO THE INTENTION OF THE 
PARTIES. 
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The trial Court found : 
"The Court is of the opinion further that the evi-
dence is clear and convincing that at the time the 
deed was signed, conveying the property from Fay 
Beckstead to the Plaintiffs that the intention was 
to convey a strip of land 200 feet deep, beginning 
on the easterly edge of Ninth East which would be 
233 and a fraction feet from the center of Ninth 
East." (R.172.) See also, Finding No.5, (R. 177). 
The following evidence fully supports the findings 
of the Trial Court: 
1. The Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit 1 ) 
dated January 13, 1951, did not make mention of any 
right of way nor did it set forth any point of commence-
ment. It simply stated the boundary distances. 
2. The Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9) 
dated January 30, 1951, did not make mention of any 
right of way over the property. 
3. The Warranty Deed from Mr. James M. Dun-
ster to his daughter, Fay Dunster Beckstead, (Exhibit 4) 
dated July 24, 1948, did not make mention of any right 
of way over the property. 
4. The Warranty Deed from the defendant Fay 
Beckstead to the Plaintiffs (Exhibit 10) dated Dec. 29, 
1951, makes no mention of any right of way over the 
property. 
5. The F.H.A. building plat (Exhibit 5) shows all 
measurements from a line 40 feet from the west side of 
the home, which corresponds with the evidence as to the 
location of an old fence line. (Exhibits 1, 2, photographs.) 
Both Plaintiffs testified that the plat, signed in the lower 
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right hand comer by Defendant George L. Beckstead, Jr., 
was given them before their purchase by the said E. R. 
Beckstead who told them the plat described the ground 
they were buying. He said "It started, like this print, at 
the fence line." (R. 122.) 
6. During the Spring of 1952 the defendants visited 
with the Plaintiffs in the home, saw the "dog run" which 
had been constructed by the Plaintiffs. ( R. 64.) The De-
fendants did not object to the location of the "dog run" 
at the time although it was located on the land subse-
quently claimed by the Defendants. 
7. Alma J. Janke, also testified that upon receipt 
of the tax notice in the Fall of 1952, he talked to De-
fendant George L. Beckstead, Jr. in Dugway, Utah by 
telephone and upon questioning by Mr. Janke, about the 
point of commencement, Mr. Beckstead answered: "The 
property line was at this monument on the north corner." 
(R. 65.) 
8. In the latter part of 1953, Mr. Beckstead and 
Mr. Dunster measured and surveyed the property with a 
tape and placed a series of stakes. The point of com-
mencement chosen by Beckstead for his surveying was the 
fence post on the northwest corner of Plaintiffs' property, 
on the east edge of Ninth East. (R. 65, 66, 67.) Mr. 
Janke testified that he took a series of 8 photographs later 
in the week (Exhibit 3) of the stakes driven in on this 
occasion. The area encompassed by these stakes was 200 
feet by 140 feet commencing at the said stake and fence 
post. (R. 69, et seq., R. 122.) 
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9. For over two years the Plaintiffs occupied the 
parcel of 200 feet by 140 feet measured from the said 
northwest stake with the full consent of the Defendants 
until the latter part of 1953. (R. 164, Exhibit 7.) 
10. Mrs. Janke testified that Mr. Beckstead told 
her "That is where it starts" gesturing to the northwest 
stake. ( R. 116, 11 7, 118. ) 
11. Mrs. Janke testified that Mr. E. R. Beckstead 
told the Plaintiffs, prior to purchase and on the occasion 
he delivered the F.H.A. plat to them that the plat showed 
the ground they were purchasing. (R. 122.) 
Point III. REFORMATION OF A DEED TO CON-
FORM TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES 
IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE. 
Appellants advance as their primary basis for appeal, 
the enigmatic Parol Evidence Rule. (Appellants' Brief, p. 
10 et seq.) 
The Rule: 
"Stated in general terms, the force or effect of the 
rule is to require, in the absence of a showing of 
fraud, mistake or accident, the exclusions of parol 
or extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, add to or 
subtract from the terms of a valid written agree-
ment or instrument." Vol. 2 .Jones on Evidence, 
4th Ed., at p. 820. 
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Jones then explains the numerous exceptions to the 
"rule." At Section 437, Op. Cit., he writes: 
"The rule which permits of the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence for the purpose of showing that 
a purported contract has no "legal existence" is 
frequently invoked where the written memorial 
of the transaction is attacked on the ground of mis-
take. The jurisdiction to reform written instru-
ments in cases free from fraud is exercised only 
when the instrument actually executed differs 
from what both parties intended to execute and 
supposed that they were executing or accepting. 
(Citing Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 Pac. 
100 ( 1919). 
"So in other actions, legal or equitable in their 
nature, brought on written instruments, either 
party is at liberty under proper pleadings to 
prove a mistake and to have reformation of the 
contract." Jones, p. 833. 
Another leading authority in the field, American 
Law of Property~ ( 1952) Vol. III, Section 12.86 states the 
rule in substantially the same terms: 
"It is the rule that when the evidence discloses any 
of the recognized grounds for the reformation of 
instruments generally, equity will reform either a 
deed or a mortgage so as to express the true in-
tention of the parties. (Citing the early ( 1900) 
Utah case, Center Creek JV aters, etc. Co. v. 
Lindsay, 21 Utah 192, 60 Pac. 559.) The correc-
tion may apply to the exclusion of matters erron-
eously inserted or the insertion of terms and 
conditions omitted by mistake." 
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Another authority states: 
"A latent ambiguity, that is, an uncertainty which 
does not appear on the face of the instrument but 
which is shown to exist for the first time by mat-
ter outside the writing may be explained or clari-
fied by parol evidence. The surrounding facts and 
circumstances may be shown for this purpose." 
(20 Am. Jur. Sec. 1157.) 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs submit that the terse language of Justice 
Henriod in Morley v. Willden, 120 Utah 423, 235 P. 2d 
500 ( 1951) ably summarizes their position. 
"The voluminous record in this case contains con-
siderable uncontroverted and much controverted 
evidence. A careful examination thereof leads us 
to conclude that the trial court's findings and de-
cision are supported by a fair preponderance of 
the evidence and should remain undisturbed." 
Plaintiffs urge this Court to affirm the finding of the 
Trial Court that a mistake of the parties justified the re-
formation of the deed. The Judgment of the Trial Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAM M. DUNCAN 
DUNCAN AND DUNCAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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